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I 1. 
The Commission of the European Communities forwarded to the European 
Parliament the Eleventh Report on Competition Policy (Doc. 1-86/82). At its 
April 1982 part-session the European Parliament referred this report to the 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs as the committee responsible and to 
the Legal Affairs Committee- for its opinion. 
On 28 April 1982 the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs appointed 
Mr J. PAPANTONIOU rapporteur. It considered the report at its meetings of 
27/28 May 1982, 27/28 September 1982 and 3/4 November 1982 and, at the last of 
these meetings, adopted it unanimously with two abstentions • 
.. 
The following took part in the vote: Mr J. Moreau, chairman; Mr Hopper, 
vice-chairman; Mr Papantoniou, rapporteur; Mr Beazley, Mr Bonaccini, Mrs Desouches, 
Mr de Ferranti, Miss Forster, Mr Franz, Mr Herman, Mr Leonardi, Mrs Nielsen 
(deputizi.ng for Mr Delorozoy), Mr Purvis (deputizing for Sir Brandon Rhys Williams>, 
Mr Rogalla (deputizing for Mr Walter>, Mr Rogers, Mr von Bismarck, Mr Wagner, 
Mr Wedekind <deputizing for Mr Schnitker> and Mr Welsh. 
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A 
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs hereby submits to the European 
Parliament the following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory 
statement: 
on the Eleventh Report of the Commission of the European Communities on 
Competition Policy 
having regard to the Eleventh Report of the Commission of the European 
Communities on Competition Policy (Doc. 1-86/82>, 
having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
Committee and the opinion of the Legal Affairs Committee (Doc. 1-845/82>, 
1. Reaffirms its belief that competition policy has a key role to play in the 
present period of adjustment of Community production structures to the 
changes in relative prices, in cost and demand conditions as well as in 
the international economic environment that have occurred over the last 
decade; this role essentially consists in organizing the play of market 
forces so as to encourage the shift of productive resources from less to 
more efficient uses while ensuring that the consumer reaps the benefits of 
higher productivity; 
2. Agrees that the significant intensification of international competition and 
the Community's diminished competitiveness in important sectors make a coor-
dinated approach to industrial restructuring imperative and that, in this 
connection, the role of public assistance and mergers needs to be considered; 
3. Points out, in this context, that the need for Community competition policy 
to account for scale economies and the uneven distribution of adjustment 
costs is greater now than at any other time in the Community's history owing 
to the adverse effects of the prolonged economic recession on employment 
and incomes; 
4. Renews its call to the Commission for greatly expanded research on the ef-
ficiency and competitiveness of the Community economic structures, especially 
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in a world context, and on the role of public assi~tance and intervention 
and of mergers in the process of economic adjustment; 
5. Points out, however, that such a coordinated approach must respect the 
Treaty's fundamental principles governing competition policy and that there 
is a danger that the lack of a common structural policy in important sectors 
will impose a burden on competition policy which it will be unable to cope 
with without basic modifications; 
6. Urges the Commission to introduce measures ensuring greater coordination be-
tween DG IV and other departments, especially those dealing with economic, 
fiscal, industrial and regional problems, so as to provide the organizational 
structure for integrating the objectives of competition policy with those 
of other Community policies; 
7. Recalls its approval of the Commission's proposal for a regulation applying 
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to the air transport sector, and calls for 
careful implementation of competition policy in this sector, balancing 
measures towards liberalization against the need to avoid sudden disruption 
in the market; further calls on the Commission to draw up guidelines for 
state aids to air transport; 
8. Approves the principle of extending the rules of competition to the sea trans-
port sector, while reserving judgement on the Commission's specific proposals 
pending the forthcoming report from its Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs; 
9. Calls on the Commission to extend the scope of its directive on the trans-
parency of financial relations between Member States and their public under-
takings to include the transport sector as well, taking account of the 
regulations already adopted for the raiLways; 
10. Asks the Commission to establish to what extent port charges are made competi-
tive by the different methods of imputing infrastructure costs; 
11. Calls for a Commission analysis of the state of competition in the banking 
sector, in view of the 1981 judgement by the Court of Justice1 that the 
1
zuchner v. Bayerische Vereinsbank 
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banking sector is only exempted from the competition rules to the extent 
that any anti-competitive conduct by banks is imposed upon them by the 
monetary authorities; 
12. Notes that the Commission has now published draft proposals to replace 
Regulation 67/67 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain 
categories of exclusive dealing agreements by two new and separate regulations, 
one dealing with exclusive distribution agreements, and the other with exclus-
ive purchasing agreements, including special provisions for brewery and filling 
station agreements; 
13. Believes that a number of important policy questions are raised by the draft 
proposals to replace Regulation 67/67 (such as whether or not they could be 
made shorter and simpler without reducing the effectiveness of Community 
competition policy>, and consequently regrets that Parliament was not con-
sulted on these proposals at an appropriate stage; 
Requests the Commission not to adopt its proposals before hearing the views 
of the appropriate committee of Parliament; 
14. Fully supports the need for new block exemptions in these areas; expresses 
concern, however, that there may well be too many detailed conditions in the 
new drafts, and that the end result might be to increase the number of noti-
fications to a degree that might partially undercut the value of the block 
exemptions; 
Points out that these drafts could be made simpler and shorter without reducing 
the effectiveness of Community competition policy~ which could be properly 
enforced by other means, including making full use of the possibilities opened 
up by Article 86 of the Treaty concerning abuse of a dominant position, having 
on hand more detailed economic findings on the special characteristics of 
particular markets and making greater use of the power of withdrawing the ben-
efits of exemption in the case of findings of abuse; 
15. Expresses its concern that the special provisions applied to exclusive pur-
chasing arrangements which link Title 1 to Title 2 of the published text of 
the proposed amendment to Regulation 67/67 may not improve competition but 
could seriously affect the range of consumer choice; 
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16. Reaffirms its requests in its resolution on the Tenth Report on Competition 
Policy for the overall competitive effects of distribution agreements to be 
examined in greater detail from an economic rather than just a legal poin~ 
of view, and for the complex issues posed by parallel importing to be more 
closely examined; ~ 
17. Awaits the formulation of general guidelines spelling out the restrictions 
~hieh may and may not be incorporated in selective distribution systems~ 
as·promised by"the'Commission; further requests the C011mission to outline 
the results of its examination of selection distribution agreements in the 
hi-fi sector;", 
18. Recognizes that there is considerable evidence of possible distortions of 
competition in the motor vehicle distribution sector, including attempts by 
some Community manufacturers to impede parallel imports of their products, 
even by potential direct purchasers, and also the existence of very great 
disparities in~the retail prices of new-motor vehicles which may not always 
be wholly justified by differences in the market conditions in the various 
Member States due to differing national, fiscal, monetary and exchange rate 
policies; 
Calls, in consequence, for the Commission to pursue its study of the whole 
range of problems associated with competition in the motor vehicle distribution 
sect~~, to ~xamine the degree to which there really are unjustified distortions 
of competition and to look, in particular, at the reasons for such major price 
discrepancies a's clearly exist; 
Calls for vigorous Commission action in cases where distortions of competition 
are clearly established; 
~9. Notes that the Commission has put f~rward a preliminary draft regulation on 
motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements and considers that the 
establishment of appropriate guidelines for such agreements, which would 
preserve the benefits of such agreements while preventin9 competitive distor-
tions, would be of great utility; 
Endorses the view that the block exemption for motor vehicle distributors 
should be conditional on their undertaking to supply a full range of products 
suitable for use in all parts of the Community; 
20. Notes, as regards a possible block exemption regulation for patent licensing, 
which has been under consideration now for some years, that the European Court 
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of Justice has recently made a ruling in the Breeders-rights-maize seed case; 
awaits an analysis from the Commission on how it is proposing to proceed in 
this field in the Light of this judgement, and whether it is planning to 
make any modifications to its original proposals; recalls in this regard the 
promise made by the Commission to submit any revised proposal for patent 
Licensing to the Parliament for its review; 
21. Regrets the inconsistency of the Commission in submitting certain proposals, 
such as its preliminary draft regulation on motor vehicle distribution and 
servicing agreements, to the appropriate committee of Parliament for its 
comments before formal publication of the proposals in the Official Journal, 
while not submitting others, such as the draft proposals to replace 
Regulation 67/67; requests that all such proposals be transmitted to Parliament's 
appropriate committee at a preliminary stage, in order to permit P·arliament 
to offer timely comments to the Commission; 
22. Notes the Commission's decision1 that the terms of an agreement providing for 
a joint resale price maintenance system among the Dutch-Language book associ-
ations CVBVB and VBBB) were not compatible with Article 85 of the Treaty; 
recalls its resolution on the fixing of book prices2 to which the Commission 
has not yet properly responded, and requests the Commission to develop guide-
lines for the application of the rules of competition in the book sector 
taking into account the special features of the sector; further requests the 
Commission to keep it fully informed of the results of the special studies 
that it has commissioned3 in regard to competition in the book publis~ing 
industry, and of the conclusions that it has drawn; 
23. Expresses satisfaction that the Commission has included new sections on the 
application of competition policy to small and medium-sized enterprises and 
to non-Community undertakings, including multinationals, in the Eleventh 
Report; requests that sections on these themes be included in subsequent annual 
reports; 
24. Expresses doubt as to whether smaller and medium-sized enterprises (SME> are 
fully aware that the Community's rules on competition offer valuable scope 
for cooperation and agreements between small and medium-sized enterprises; 
calls on the Commission, as part of a policy to promote small and medium-sized 
--------~--------------
1Decision of 25.11.1981, OJ L 54 of 25.2.82 
2
oJ C 50 of 9.3.1981 
3Answer to Written Question No. 514/81 by Mr. Beyer de Ryke- OJ C 240 of 18.9.1981 
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enterprises, to ensure that they are better informed of the possibilities 
open to them in this field; 
25. Considers that it would be useful, in the context of the 1983 year of SME, 
for the Commission to publish a guide on Community competition law for SME, 
pointing out, in particular, the enhanced possibility for SME to cooperate 
with other enterprises, especially at a time when the development of the new 
information technologies is opening up particular new possibilities for sucn 
cooperation; 
26. Calls on the Commission to carry out a more detailed review of the applicatiion 
of the competition rules to small and medium-sized enterprises and of any 
special problems that have risen, with a view to seeing whether further measures 
· are needed; 
27. Welcomes renewal of the regulation on the application of Article 85(3) of 
the Treaty to categories of specialization agreements, a regulation which is 
of particular interest to SME; wonders, however, if its scope could not be 
extended even further to help enhance, in particular, the world-wide competi-
tive potential of Community firms in certain highly technical fields; 
28. Notes that the Commission has adopted an amended version of its draft regu--
lation on the control of concentration between undertakings, on which 
Parliament has continually called for progress and on which no action has 
been taken by the Council since the original proposal was transmitted in 
1973; awaits the report of its competent committee on the special details of 
this revision, but again points out the need for more background economic re-
search on the development of concentration in specific sectors, and the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of such concentration; 
Further reiterates the need to ensure sufficient Commission personnel to be 
able to effectively implement any regulation that might eventually be adopted; 
Strongly urges the Commission, in the meantime, to continue making vigorous 
use of the possibilities granted by Article 86 of the Treaty and by the sub-
sequent interpretations of this Article by the Court; 
29. Believes that the competition policy must be developed in the light of the 
increasing prevalence of transnational operations, always remembering that 
the purpose is to assist and not to impede the operation of economic forces; 
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30. Deplores, in this regard, the Commission's failure to acknowledge Parliament's 
repeated calls for action to eliminate transfer pricing abuses; calls on 
the Commission to proceed to a review of the transfer pricing practices of 
multinational enterprises, assess the resulting distortions of competition 
and suggest ways to eliminate such abuses; requests the Commission to re-
port back on progress in implementing the 1977 Directive on mutual assistance 
between the relevant authorities of the Member States in the field of 
direct· taxation, and in particular, as to whether it is now appropriate to 
draw up a body of rules on transfer pricing following the pooling of experi~ 
ence in this field called for in Article 10 of the Directive; 
31. Recognizes the difficult task facing the Commission .in controlling national 
aids in a period of economic recession and industrial restructuring; believes 
however, that, in view of the growing importance and complexity of aid pro-
grammes, the pragmatic approach adopted by the Commission no longer faces 
up to the task and that policy rules, alongside the practical guidelines-
de.vis,ed so far, should encompass a more rigorous conception of the Community 
interest; 
32. Believes that the Commission's efforts must be directed towards the progress-
ive elimination of all national aids which are not covered by specific exemp-
tions applying equally in all Member States; 
33. Invites the Commission, following the recent Court of Justice decision in 
the Philip Morris case, to take a broad view of Community objectives with 
regard to aids that are not specific to regions or sectors; 
34. Approves the general positions taken by the Commission with regard to regional 
aids, but insists that initiatives in this field should be better integrated 
with the Community's overall regional policy; calls on the Commission to 
provide more precise information in its next report on the criteria and in-
dicators it uses for scrutinizing national aid schemes; 
35. Supports the principle of assisting crisis sectors, but expresses concern at 
the commitment of an increasing amount of resources to industries with limited 
growth potential in the Community as a whole; points out that some forms of 
intervention, in particular the introduction of the quota system in the steel 
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indus~ry, tend to punish the efficient producers and may not lead to com-
petitive production patterns from the Community point of view; considers 
that the problem of national aids, which constitute a major threat to the 
unity of the common market, can best be approached through a series of de-
tailed policies which apply the principles of Articles 8S and 86 to -indi-
vidual sectors; calls, therefore, on the Commission to integrate its action ~. 
in this field into the framework of an overall industrial strategy for the 
Community and requests more information on the methods employed for, and 
the results obtajned from, the a posteriori monitoring of sectoral policies. 
and aids; 
36. In this context, calls attention to the sector.al -agreement to reduce man-
made fibre capacity and requests the Commission to investigate allegations 
that in some cases.production capacity is being artificially maintained and 
to report to Parliament as soon as possible; 
37. Welcomes the. inclusion in the Annex to the Eleventh Report of a. list of 
aids to which the Commission raised no objection at the time; asks that 
such a list be not only included in subsequent reports but also e~panded 
into a full list of all current aids, specifying their durati-on; efllphasize~ 
again that the Commission has the important task of ensuri~g that the Member 
States report their plans for granting aid and that these aids are of a 
degressive and temporary nature; 
38. Welcomes the substantialprogress made in eliminating the discriminatory 
aspects of state monopolies of a commercial character, but points out that 
there is still mucb to be done regarding the tobacco monopolies, the quota 
system for intra-Community road transport permits and air transport in par-
ticular; 
39. Welcomes the recent decision by the European Court of Justice reaffirming 
the validity of the Commission•s Directive on the transparency of financial 
relations between Member States and public undertakings; 
40. Renews its call for a study on the implications of Spanish and Portuguese 
entry into the Community for competition policy, as considerable problems 
of adjustment are likely to be encountered; 
41. Points out the need to complement action on competition policy within the 
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Community with action aimed at controlling distortions of competition at 
international level; 
42. Considers that the Community must take an active part in the different in-
ternational fora in improving the operation of international competitioh 
procedures and rules for the free exchange of goods and services. The 
planned GATT ministerial meeting offers a useful point of departure for new 
initiatives in this area; 
Regrets that the deadlock in negotiations for the proposed United Nations 
code of conduct on the transfer of technology has still not been broken; 
Notes that negotiations on the establishment of rules concerning flags of 
convenience have been taking place under UNCTAD auspices, but that no final 
decisions have yet been taken; asks to be kept fully informed of the pro-
gress of these negotiations; 
43. Points out again that the issues posed by the extra-territorial application 
of competition laws, as shown by the enactment of 'blocking' laws in certain 
Community countries, and of disclosure of documents, are growing in import-
ance and urges the Commission to improve its cooperation with the anti-trust 
authorities of non-member countries for dealing with them; 
44. Urges the speedy implementation of a Community convention on the reciprocal 
recognition of copyright and of judgements in Community courts of law as to 
copyright, as a first step towards a concerted Community stand against copy-
right infringements by producer$ in third countries and the unfair competition 
this represents; 
45. Deeply regrets that the Commission fails to respond to Parliament's repeated 
calls for a campaign to eliminate competition abuses in other parts of the 
world; points out that this is an essential condition for the establishment 
of genuine internal competitio~ and stresses again that fragmentation of 
responsibilities within the Commission should not be an obstacle to taking 
the necessary initiatives; renews, therefore, its call on the Commission not 
to confine itself simply to participating in the activities of the international 
bodies concerned, but to contribute its utmost to: 
the campaign against international tax evasion, 
the abolition of tax havens, 
the elimination of flags of convenience, 
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the abolition of other unfair practices in the field of 
competition such as the existence of sharp international 
differences in foreign investment incentives and regulations; 
46. Welcomes the new section in the Eleventh Report devoted to procedural issues, 
responding to Parliament's prior criticisms1. in a far fuller way than ever 
before, and putting forward a number of suggestions for improving its own 
procedures; believes that the Commission's response, while not wholly satis-
factory, constitutes a basis for making real improvements to these procedures; 
47. Notes that the Commission has come down firmly in the Eleventh Report in 
favour of a two-tier system of judicial review of Commission decisions, a 
court of first instance dealing with questions both of fact and of law, 
and a court of second instance merely re-examining questions of law; 
Believes that a reform of this kind could well be highly desirable and calls 
for the Commission to report back as soon as possible, and at the latest 
by the next year's report, on the practicalities of such a proposal and, 
in particular, on how a competition court might be constituted and· on the 
exact range of its functions; 
48. Notes that Parliament's prior suggestion2 for the possible appointment of 
an independent person or persons from wit~in the Commission but independent 
of DG IV, or else appointed by the Court, is regarded unfavourably by the 
Commission; further notes that the Commission is envisaging the appointment 
of hearings officers, and has in fact recently appointed an 'adviser-listener' 
to ensure the smooth running of hearings; 
Requests the Commission to give more details on how it is proceeding on this 
matter and on the scope of the 'adviser-listener's' responsibilities; 
recognizes the value of having such a person within DG IV, and with direct 
access to the Commissioner responsible, but believes that the scope of his 
function should not be limited to ensuring the smooth running of hearings 
alone; 
1
e.g. in its resolutions on the Ninth and, in particular, on the Tenth 
Annual Reports on Competition Policy. 
2In point 41 of its resolution on the Tenth Report, op. cit. 
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49. Notes that applications for exemption and for negative clearance, in particular, 
have taken up to 18 years to be disposed of; and seldom less than 18 months, 
and that the number of pending cases of all kinds before the Commission has 
risen to 4,365, with no les.s than 185 applications or notifications being 
made in 1981 alone; further notes that in contrast the Commission took 11 
formal decisions in 1981 applying Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty and 
11 applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, and that 121 cases were 
settled without the need for a formal decision; 
Believes that this great backlog of undecided cases underlines the urgent 
need to expedite Commission procedures; 
50. Notes the Commission's proposal to strengthen the legal value of so-called 
comfort letters by ensuring prior publication of a Notice in the Official 
Journal, and also its proposal to take simplified exemption decisions 
to solve the problem of the numerous cases having common features, but 
requests the Commission to clarify what it has in mind in this latter 
regard; 
51. Considers that the Commission will also have to take other measures to 
expedite its procedures and should consider, for instance, the proposals 
recently made in this regard1 to amend Regulation 17 so as to confer 
automatic exemption on an agreement after the lapse of a specified period 
or else to provide some form of provisional exemption after an uncontested 
period ~uchas 90 day~ from the publication of an agreement and until a 
final decision by the Commission; 
52. Requests the Commission to provide further details as to how far it 
intends to go allowing firms involved in a procedure to have access 
1 
to the file in a particular case, and also as to how it intends to proceed 
in the field of legal professional privilege, in the light of the decision 
by the European Court of Justice in the A M and S case; 
In the report oo ~itioo practice by the Select Carmittee oo the 
European Communities of the British House of Lords 
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53. Notes that the economic research carried out by the Commission in the 
field of competition policy - as outlined in the final chapter of the 
report -especially that concernign market and price structures, while 
occasionally providing valuable insights, lacks clarity, is short on 
analysis and often seems insufficiently linked to the practical economic 
issues encountered by DG IV in its everyday work; 
54. Further notes that considerable criticism has often been expressed of the 
Commission's economic judgements in specific cases, such as in its 
definition of the relevant market, while whole areas of its activity, in 
particular the control of government assistance to, and intervention in, 
industry do not receive any systematic analytical treatment; 
55. Calls, therefore, for a reinforcement of the economic research capability 
of DG IV and urges the Commis.sion to ensure greater integration of DG IV's 
economic research with the rest of its activities; 
56. Points out that such more clearly focussed research could consist of 
the following: 
(i) Analyses of the state of competition and efficiency in individual 
sectors, including the definition of the relevant market, the 
international aspects of competition, the advantages and 
disadvantages of industrial concentration, and the existence of, 
and reasons for, major price disparities for similar products 
in particular sectors; 
(ii) Research on more general competition policy problems common to 
a number of sectors, such as the effects on competition of 
selective and exclusive distribution agreements and of patent 
licensing agreements; and 
(iii) Research in the crea on more general competition pol icy problems 
common to a number of sectors, such as the long-term impact of 
aids on industrial structures and efficiency and the effectiveness 
of crisis carte~s; 
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57. Calls for more explanation by the Commission as to how it chooses 
particular subjects to be studied by outside experts in the •evolution 
of concentration and competition series•; asks for more information on 
the practical use subsequently made of these studies and stresses once 
again that the Commission must follow up its enquiries on price structures 
with measures designed to eliminate unacceptable price disparities; 
Final remarks 
-------------
58. Welcomes the inclusion in the reprot of a separate chapter on competition 
policy and the role of socio-economic and political interest groups, 
as well as the Commission's decision to consult the Economic and Social 
Committee on competition policy issues of general Community interest 
covered in the Annual Report; believes, however, that the effective 
cooperation and support of industry associations, trade unions, consumer 
and other interest groups with regard to general or specific objectives 
of Community competition policy require a greater effort on the part 
of the Commisison consisting of more frequent bilateral contacts and 
better exchange of information; 
59. Calls most emphatically for the inclusion of a chapter on non-tariff 
barriers and asks to be informed of further action taken on the 
Commission's proposal relating to the provision of information in the 
1 field of technical standards and regulations ; 
60. Welcomes the fact that the Commission has acted upon some of the 
recommendations approved by the Parliament in its previou~ resolutioos 
on competition policy, but notes that there still is a considerable 
number of issues which have not been adequately covered_or even 
acknowledged by the Commission; believes that the progress registered 
in the Eleventh Report should now be built upon, and insists that in 
each subsequent report subjects previously raised by the Parliament 
receive an effective response from the Commission; 
61. Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the report of its 
committee to the Council and the Commission. 
1 European Parliament resdution of 8 May 1981, OJ C 144, 15.6.1981, p.122 
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1. The central importance of Community competition policy is illustrated by 
the fact that it is less and less easy to do justice to the subject within the 
framework of one annual review by the Parliament. Indeed a number of key 
competition policy issues will not be covered in detail in the present report, 
sinte they have been, or will be, the subject of separate reports by the 
Parliament, such as the Commission's proposals to apply the rules of competition 
.n the air transport, and in the sea transport sectors, the Commission's 
revised proposals on merger controls, the issues of aids to the steel 
industry, possible distortions of competition in the automobile sector. 
2. Furthermore the field of competition policy is not ene which is particularly 
suitable to Parliament's traditional procedures for giving its opicion on 
specific new proposals, since what is at stake is often more the Commission's 
continuing administration of competition policy rather thanjust the exami~ation 
of new initiatives. Even when the Commission does put forward draft 
regulations, as it has on several occasions this year, the normal Community 
consultation procedures do not apply, as it is the Commission itself which has 
the final say, after having consulted the Advisory Committee of experts from 
the member states. ·No formal opinion by the Parliament is therefore, required, 
although Parliament has been informally consulted on the proposal for a 
directive on the transparency of financial relations between member States and 
public undertakings, and the preliminary draft regulation on the application 
of Article 85' (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle 
&istribution and servicing agreements. 
- 18 - PE 80.041 /fin. 
,-. 
3. And yet competition policy is an area where the Community through the 
Commission has direct powers raising the need for a more systematic 
review on the part of the European Parliament than has been the case in 
the past. 
4. This report then briefly examines the range of topics covered in the 
Commission's 11th Report on competition policy, treating in Little 
detaiL those which are being covered elsewhere within Pad fament and 
concentrating on some issues of central importance. In particular, 
section II analyses the basic objectives of Community competition policy 
in a period of economic recession. Section III comments on some of the 
initiatives the Commission has taken in the course of the last year in 
order to apply the rules of competition to the air and sea transport 
sectors. Section IV reviews a wide range of activities with regard to 
the application of competition policy towards enter~~ises· with particular 
emphasi's on the question of distribution agreements and the application of the 
competition rules to multinational undertakings. Section V diScusses the 
action of the Commission in the field of government'assistance, 
especially as regards the control of national aids. Section VI' examines 
briefly some of the international aspects of the application of 
<:ommunity competition po·Licy. Section VII comments in !ome deta'H on the 
Commission's response to Parliament•s criticism's of its procedures. 
Section VIII discusses some of the problems connected with the 
Commission's economic research on competition matters and makes 
recommendations on how to improve it. Finally, section IX evaluates 
the progress made in the direction of closer involvement of socio-economic 
and political interest groups in the conduct of Commun;ty competition 
policy, including the Commission's responsiveness to Parliament's comments 
and requests. 
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5. The considerable changes in relative prices, demand patterns, technology 
as well as in the international economic environment that have occurredover 
the last decade pose problems of structural adjustment to an extent not 
yet experienced in the -Community's history. Such problems tend to be 
particularly pronounced in those lines of activity which are large consumers 
of energy, produce goods and services for which substitutes have been 
found, suffer from technological retardation or face competition from the 
newly industrialising countries. Competition policy is a key element 
in an adjustment strategy since its central objective is to prevent 
economic a_gents from exploiting undue advantages in their access 
to factor and product markets so as to extend the area for econo~ic choice 
and .establish the conditions necessary for achieving an efficient allocationf 
of productive resources. 
6. The pursuit, however, of this central objective should be temper~d by 
two considerations.. The first is the existence, in modern industrial 
ec~nomies, of important scale economies pointing to the need for bigger 
units than those deemed compatible with the classicaL rules of 
competition. The second consideration is that economic agents are not 
endowed with the same assets or face the same circumstances so that the cost 
of a certain economic choice differs depending on the position of the 
agent inyolved. Certain regions may experience high unemployment or 
have inadequate infrastructure, particular groups of workers may be 
.cHsadv~ntaged while some sec~ors may face more intense international 
competition than others. The effects of closing a plant, or the 
incentives re_quired for setting up a new one, therefore differ according 
' . 
to the region, social group or sector involved and such differences should 
be made good if the desired restructuring is to proceed in a smooth and 
efficient way. 
7. The importance of such considerations has grown recently on account of the 
prolongation of the economic recession and the associated intensification 
of international competition. As recently pointed out by the OECD, 
"the need to combat inflation and improve balance-of-payments equilibrium 
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encourages most governments to adopt restrictive measures of a 
budgetary or monetary character which mainly affect overall demand" 
so that "the adjustment or conversion of certain sectors •••• takes place 
against a background of reduced economic growth, and this can only 
aggravate the problems of unemployment and regional development" <1>. 
At the same time intensified international competition, by squeezing profit 
margins, tends to reinforce the trend to increased concentration. 
8. The effective application of Community competition policy is thus a complex 
task involving the reconciliation of a number of often competing considerations 
and, in a more general way, the integration of the particular objectives 
of the Community. Such integration is not manifest in the Commiss·ion's 
action in the competition field as will be suggested in subsequent sections 
of this report, particularly in the section dealing with government 
assistance. A first requirement for improved performance is to strengthen 
and redirect the economic research carried out by, or on behalf of, the 
Commission with a view to developing an integrated concept of competition 
policy. 
The scope of such research is reviewed in the last section of this report 
and includes the efficiency and competitiveness of Community industrial 
structures, especially in a world context, and the role of public 
assistance and intervention in the process of economic adjustment. 
9. A second requirement for achieving greater integration is to introduce 
measures ensuring the coordination of DG IV and other departments, 
especially those dealing with economic, fiscal, industrial and regional 
problems. Such coordination does not seem to be sufficiently developed in 
the Commission, a recent example being the absence of DG IV involvement 
in the study on the competitiveness of Community undertakings vis-a-vis 
its rivals in third countries. It is evidently important that the 
Commission coordinates the results of this study with the work of DG IV. 
<1> "The Role of Competition Policy in a period of Economic Recession 
with Special Reference to Crisis Cartels", OECO November 1981. 
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10. The Commission descdbes, in the 11th Report, the initiatives that it has 
taken in the course of the last year to apply the rules of competition to 
the air and sea transport sectors. 
11. The Commission's regulation applying Articles 85 and 86 to air transport has 
been the subject of a recent resolution from the European Parliament on the 
basis of a report drawn up by Mr. Schwarzenberg.<1 >The Parliament approved the . 
Commission's initiative but requested the Commission to give more precise 
indications as to its exact scope. 
12. The Commission's second major initiative in the field of air transport, its 
draft Council Directive on tariffs for scheduled air transport, is · 
currently being examined within the Parliament's Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs. Already a division of opinion is apparent between those who 
would approve the proposal as a useful first step towards opening Up 
competition and those who would prefer other approaches which would leave the 
present system more· intact. 
13. The 11th Report also mentions the Commission's initiative in sending questions 
to national governments aiming to find out where to draw the line btween the 
powers of public authorities and the responsibilities of the companies in 
relation to tariff fixing, and to airlines concerning the application of certain 
practices such as capacity-sharing arrangements. The Commission should present 
a summary of its findings as soon as possible. 
14. Finally it should be noted that a number of other competition policy problems 
remain untackled in the field of air transport, such as the fundamental question 
market access and the non-applicability of the Commission's Directive on 
. transparency of financial relations between public enterprises and Member 
st'ates to the sector of air transport. The formulation of Community guidelines 
(1 > OJ 
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to cover national aids in this field is apparently being considered by the 
Commission but no such guidelines have yet appeared. The air transport sector 
has special characteristics which pose particular probtems for the 
straightforward application of Community competition policy but, nevertheless, 
the issues raised above should be tackled by the c·o•hsion .as soon as possible. 
• As regards the Commission's draft regulation applying Articles 85 and 86 to sea 
transport, this is clearly an area of intense controversy and will be covered in 
a separate reptrt by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. 
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16. The 11th Report outlines a wide range of activities with regard to tht 
appli.cation of competition policy towards enterprises. Besides description 
-of the major cases decided by the Court of'Justice, and the main decisions 
and measures taken by the Commission, the 11th Report also outlines progress on 
the initiatives taken by the Commission,to replace Regulation 67/67 on 
exclusiye dealing by two new regulations, its preliminary draft regulation 
concerning distribution and pre and after sales service in the motor vehicle 
sector, and its revised merger control proposal. It also includes new 
sections on the application of the competition rules to small and medium-sized 
enterprises, and to non-Community undertakings and multinationals. 
17. The Commission has now published (1) its latest dratt proposals to replace 
Regulation 67/67 on the application of Article 85-3 of the Treaty to certain 
categories of exclusive dealing agreements. As a result of its experience it it 
now proposing two separate regulations. The first would grant a block 
exemption to exclusive distribution agreements meeting certain criteria. The 
second would give a block exemption to certain exclusive purchasing agreements, 
and it defines three such categories of agreement for which specific con~itions 
for exemption are spelled out, exclusive purchasing obligations of short and 
medium duration such as occur in all sectors of the economy,and long term 
exclusive purchasing agreements, firstly for the resale of beer,and 
finally of motor spirit and lubricants for motor vehicles in filling stations. 
18. Well thought-out block exemptions deserve strong support, and clearly have the 
potential to be highly valuable instruments in the administration of competitior 
policy. Put forward in areas where experience has shown that the advantages 
of such agreements generally override certain anti-competitive effects that 
they may have, and where the Commission would otherwise have an enormous amount 
ot extra work to do, they have several potential benefits. 
(1) OJ C 172 of 10.7.~2 
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They can greatly lessen the administrative burden on the Commission, thus 
freeing limited Commission resources for other priority tasks, they 
can provide greater certainty for firms, and also speed up the taking of 
decisions, and the making of agreements with beneficiaL effects for the 
Community economy. They can often be of special help to small and medium-
sized firms. 
19. In evaluating proposals for such block exemptions, and in these cases for the 
revision of an existing block exemption, these criteria must always be borne 
to the fore. To what extent will the proposals really reduce the Commission's work 
load, and provide greater certainty for enterprises? And if the benefit to 
the public of such agreements are real, to what extent will the benefit be 
ensured by such proposals? 
20. Bearing these criteria in mind a certain number of questions need to be raised 
i~ connection with these draft proposals. 
21. The first is whether there are too many detailed conditions in the new drafts, 
and whether the end result might not be to increase rather than diminish the 
number of notifications that would be necessary, compared to the position 
under the existing Regulation. 
22. One such example is Article 6 of the draft text on exclusive distribution 
agreements, which sets out a number of circumstances in whi'b the Commission 
can withdraw the benefit of the regulation. Article 6 (a), for instance 
defines one such case as when "the goods to which the agreement relates are 
not subject, in the territory covered by the agreement, to effective 
competition from goods considered by the consumer as similar goods in view of 
their properties, price and intended use." Exclusive distribution agreements _ 
covering entirely new products being tr.ied out 1n a particular market, might, 
therefore, not be covered. 
23. Then Article 6 (d) (2) would provide for the withdrawal of the benefit when 
"the exclusive distributor ••• sells the goods to which the agreement relates 
at excessively high prices." 
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24. It is clear that major pricing discrepancies in the Community need to be 
rigorously analyzed by the Commission, and action ta~en when necessary, 
but the inclusion of this clause .1n the draft could create more rather than 
less~ uncer~ainty. What is an excessively high price? 
25. Furthermore the draft block exemption on exclusive purchasing agreement 
gives an exemption Cin Article 1> to agreements " ••• of not more than one year 
••• ". This would appear to be too short a period of time. Might it not be 
a better approach to have a longer time period, perhaps combined with 
stipulation of a maximum period for the termination of an agreement, such as 
not more than 12 months? 
26. In addition both drafts lay down size criteria, whereby the exemption will not 
apply in cases where manufacturers of competing goods enter into a non-reciprocal 
exclusive purchasing agreement between themselves unless at least one of them 
has a total annual turnover not exceeding 100 million ECU. The objective is 
a good one, and yet the result may be overly restrictive when combined with 
the very far reaching definition of what constitutes a manufacturer in Article 5 
of both texts. 
27. Conversely there may be agreements which would not be excluded from the operation 
of the block exemption by the size criterion where more protection 
is necessary, such as when a small manufacturer is dealing with a more powerful 
exclusive distributor or purchaser. 
28. Another set of questions concerns whether the alleged benefits of exclusive 
distribution agreements are not at least partially undercut by the fact that 
the draft texts appear to put too great an emphasis on unrestricted parallel 
imports. Do the drafts provide an insufficient measure of protection for an 
exclusive dealer to offset his special promotion and other expenses? 
29. Finally the draft on exclusive purchasing singles out two sets of special 
provisions for brewery agreements, and for filling station agreements. Are 
there not 0ther categories of agreement to which such special longer-term 
provisions could applyZ 
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30. That these and other questions about the drafts are important ones is illustrated 
,,. by the fact that replac1ng Regulation 67/67 is proving to be a difficult and 
. , lengthy process, and .that ·four attemptsr, have been made so far to come up 
· · with a satisfactory drafting. In its next report the Commission should give 
more indication than in the 11th Report on the nature of the comments that 
have been made, and on the difficulties that have arisen. 
31. For a case can certainly be made out that these drafts could be made si~pler 
and shorter without undercutting the effectiveness of Community competition 
policy. This latter could be reinforced by making vigorous use of the 
possibilities opened up by Article 86 on abuse of a dom1~ant position, and 
also by having on hand more detailed economic findings on, for instance, 
the .definition of relevant markets, and on the special characteristics of 
particular markets, and making greater use of the power to withdraw the benefits 
of exemption in the case of findings of abuse. 
32. As regards economic research in this area,the Commission has not responded 
to paragraph 16 of Parliament's resolution in the 10th Report which called for 
the overall competitive effects of dht~ibution agreements to be examined 
in greater detail from an economic rather- ~han just a legalistic pnint of 
vi.ew, nor to Paragraph 17 which called for t·he issues posed by parallel 
importing to be closely examined. 
33. A further area on which more research is needed is on price discrepancies in 
specific markets where they appear to be particularly great, and also on the 
reason~whether justified or apparently unjustified for such discrepancies. 
34. One obvious area where closer examination by the Commission oo the lines called 
for above is clearly needed, is the field of motor vehicle distribution In 
this context the Commission have issued a preliminary draft Commission 
regulation on the ap~lication of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain 
categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements. 
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35. Parliament will be examining the issues posed·for ·Competition in this sector 
in a separate report, and·detailed c~mments will not be made here. 
Nevertheless, there has been considerable evidence of possible competition 
policy distortions in this sector, including attempts by some Community manufacturer 
to try to impede parallel imports of their products by any means possible, 
such as by instructing their authorized .dealers to refer inquiries from 
potential purchasers to the authorized dealers in their country of origin, 
to announce unreasonable delivery times or to refuse to sell altogether. 
Furthermore there are very great disparities in the retail prices 9f new 
motor vehicles from one member state to another. 
36. Naturally there are explanations for many of these. disparities, such as 
·different levels of t•xation in the various member States. · 
Nevertheless they merit closer investigation, and where necessary, firm 
action by the Commissio~. 
37. An appropriate regulation on motor vehicle distribut1on and servicing agreements 
could certainly be of great utility in helping to lay down certain gaound 
rules. But this should also be complemented by a thorough Commission study 
of the whole range of problems associated with competition in the motor 
vehicle distribution sector, to examine the degree to which there 
really are un~ustified distortions of competition and to Look, in particular, 
at the reasons for such major price discrepancies as clearly exist. 
38. Enactment of a block exemption regulation for patent licensing has now been 
pending for some time. The initial proposals of the Commission came in for 
strong criticism, and then presentation of a subsequent draft was 
held up pending the decision of the Court of Justice in the Breeders rights -
maize.seed case, a decision which was recently announced. Parliament ·now awaits 
an analysis from the Commission on how it is proposing to proceed in this 
field in the light of this judgement, and whether it is planning to make any 
modifications to its original proposal. 
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39. The Eleventh Report includes a short section on application of 
the competition rules to small and medium sized enterprises, pointing 
out, in particular, some of the ways in which special measures have 
' been taken in their favour by the Commission. These include more favourable 
treatment in a number of current Commission initiatives, including its 
recently published proposals for block exemptions for exclusive 
distribution and purchasing agreements, and also in its patent 
licensing proposals. 
~0. These provisions are to be strongly welcomed in principle. While the 
actual quantitative criter1a, which are used to define the threshholds 
below which firms will be treated more Leniently, are clearly somewhat 
arbitrary, this is surely inevitable, and certain rules-of-thumb •ust be 
established <although see the co•ents in para .!A above> 
·41. What does need to be carefully examined, however, is the extent to which 
small and medium-sized enterprises are fully benefiting from more lenient 
treatment, and are fully aware of the possibilities open to them. 
For a central characteristic of most smaller firms is their more limited 
access to information and limited number of specialist advisers. In 
1976 the German authorities publ.ished a cooperation manual, (Kooperationsfibel>, 
to serve as a guide on competition law for ~nterprises wishing to 
cooperate with other enterprises. It would be useful for such a guide 
_ to be produced at European Community level, especially at a time when the 
development of the new information technologies are opening up many new 
possibilities for· such cooperation. The Commission might therefore, 
publish such a guide as part of the activities during the 1983 year of Small 
and Medium~sized Enterprises. 
42. In addition the Commission should carry out a more detailed review of 
the application of the competition rules on small and medium-sized 
enterprises and of any special problem~ that have risen, with a view to 
seeing whether further measures are needed. 
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43. Finally your rapporteur notes that the Commission has recentlY. presented 
a new draft Regulatiorr·mthe application of Article 85<3> of the Treaty to 
categories of specialization agreement, to replace the existing regulation 
which is about to lapse. This regulation, which provides that the prohibitions 
in Article 85.1 of the Treaty will not apply to certain agreements concluded 
between undertakings for the purposes of specialization of production, is 
clearly of special interest to smaller firms. Indeed it will only apply 
if the products involved do not represent, in a substantial part of the 
Common Market, more than 15% of the market for such products, if the total 
annual turnover of the participc,ting undertakings does not exceed 300 million ECU 
or if none of the participating undertakin.gs has an annual turnover of more 
than 100 million E,U. 
44. The Commission's new proposal appears to vary little from the existing 
regulation. The renewal of this regulation is clearly to be strongly 
welcomed. Nevertheless it might be asked whether its scope could not have been 
extended even further since even certain smaller firms ~n certain highly 
specialized fields might exceed, for instance, the 15% market share 
criterion in a substantial part of the Common Market. Certainly this is yet 
another area where the balance between competition policy, and industrial 
policy objectives <in particular the promotion of new technologies> needs to 
be carefully judged. 
f!'!~r:9~!-~QQ1!Q!! 
45.The need for a Council decision on the Commission's p~oposals in the field of 
merger controls has been emphasized again and again by Parliament. The issue 
is clearly highly comple~ In some sectors further concentration through 
mergers may indeed be desirable in order to face up to competitive threats 
from elsewhere in the world, while in others the process of concentration 
may already have gone too far. Even in the former case,· however, intensified 
forms of cooperation may be preferable to full-scale mergers. Economic research 
also points in different directions, with economies of scale arguments oeing 
matched by certain evidence of diseconomies caused by mergers. The need for 
a Community mechanism for reviewing mergers, which would of course allow for 
a balancing of these various factors, remains overwhelming, however, as long 
as the Commission is given sufficient resources to carry ou~ this difficult 
new set of tasks. The Commission has now put forward a revised proposal, 
which is currently the subject of separate examination within the 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. 
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46. For the first time the 11th Report includes a section on application of the 
competition rules to non-Community undertakings, and in particular their 
application to multinational undertakings. Some general considerations 
are put forward on the former topic, followed by a List of some of the major 
Community competition policy decisions affecting multinationals. 
47. This is a useful summary, and represents a partial response to Parliament's 
repeated requests for more information from the Commission on this subject. 
Nevertheless it is indeed only partial in that it telescopes more than a 
decade's worth of Commission decisions with regard to multinationals into 5 
paragraphs of description. 
48. Furthermore, at the outset, the Commission states that multinational undertaking! 
of Community origin "have no·particular features that would distinguish them 
from other European undertakings for the purposes of competition law" (point 
38) and concludes (point 42) that "until now the Commission has not experienced 
any particular difficulties in applying the competition rules to multinationals". 
49. While this may well be true from a narrowly legal point of view multinational 
enterprises clearly pose special problems for competition policy to a 
degree not recognized by the Commission. Parent-subsidiary relationships 
pose particular problems in a multinational context (for Community company 
law as well as competition policy), causing potential clashes of jurisdiction 
.(notably between the United States and the Community) and <as des~ribed 
elsewhere in the 11th Report, in point 162> helping to block agreement on 
the restrictive practices chapter of the proposed international code of 
conduct on the transfer of technology. It is Less easy to control possible 
abuses by multinational firms, such as transfer pricing abuses, which if 
not purely a competition policy problem, can clearly distort competition 
between firms. Multinationals are in a better position to take advantage 
of differences in national taxation and wages, and of unfair investment 
-31 PE 80.041 I fin. 
incentives, offered by individual states, and which can distort world-wide 
competition. More generally, such firms by drawing on large amounts of 
world-wide resources are often able to exercise significantly greater 
market power than that indicated by their share in the respective markets 
in which they operate making thus difficult to ascertain the existence 
of a dominant position in the sense of Arti·cle 86 of the EEC Treaty. 
50. Multinationals do, therefore, pose special problems for competition policy 
which need to be squarely faced and dealt with. At the level of the 
research carried out by, and on behalf of, the Commission, it is 
necessary to include international considerations such as the extent to 
which particular markets are predominantly world-wide, Community-wide, 
national or regional in scope, and the relative importance of multinational 
enterprises in such markets. 
Closer links should also be established between the Commission and the 
United Nations Centre for Transnational Enterprises, which has among its 
other activities established a data bank on multinationals, and 
carried out research projects on the degree of concentration, and the role 
of multinationals in particular sectors. These links could be very useful 
to the Commission in carrying out the research called for above. 
51. At a more practical level measures should be introduced promoting the 
disclosure of information on the part of multinational enterprises so as 
to make more transparent the economic links of the subsidiaries to their 
parents and thus limit the possibilities of abuse. It should also be 
stressed that fragmentation of responsibilities within the Commi~sion 
should not be an obstacle to taking action on important issues such as 
transfer pricing. Here, there is a clear need for close cooperation 
between DG IV and DG XV which deals with financial institutions and 
taxation. At the very least the Commission should report back on progress 
in implementing the 1977 Directive on mutual assistance between the 
relevant authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation, 
Article 10 of which called for the member States, together with the 
Commission, to pool their experience within the field of transfer pricing 
with a view to improving cooperation and, where appropriate, drawing up a 
body of rules. The Commission should also undertake a study of the transfer 
. . t . f l. . l . (1 ) h l . pr1c1ng prac 1ces o mu 1tnat1ona enterpr1ses , assess t e resu t1ng 
distortions of competition and sugg&st ways for eliminating the abuses. 
C1> The Commission has recently indicated that it is not doing research in 
this area in its reply to written question No. 99/82 by Mr. Welsh 
COJ C 151/27 of 21 .6 .82) 
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~2. The Commission states in the Eleventh Report that, in the face ·of 
continuing recession and the need for industrial restructuring, its 
role in controlling aids has become increasingly complex, particularly 
from the point of view of reconciling the competing pressures to which 
the grant of aids responds with the sometimes not necessarily confluent 
objectives of Community policy. There is no doubt that this statement 
is largely true. However, the Commission's task could be made less 
difficult by complementing the practical guidelines devised so far for 
scrutinizing national aid programmes with a more rigorous conception 
of the Community interest and a better understanding of the role of 
public authorities in assisting the process of structural adjustment. 
As already pointed out, the key to developing an integrated approach 
to competition policy is to expand economic research on the competit-iveness 
of Community industrial structures and the effectiveness of policy 
instruments in influencing their development, and to ensure closer 
coordination of DG IV with other departments of the Commission dealing, in 
particular, with economic, fiscal, industrial and regional problems. 
53. With regard to aids which are not specific to regions or sectors the 
Commission states that derogations from Article 92 (3) of the EEC Treaty 
place on. it a heavy responsibility underlined in the recent decision 
of the European Court in its judgement in the Philip Morris case. 
The central princip{e upon which this decision is based is that national 
objectives are not sufficient to justify the use of aids unless shown to 
contribute to the achievement of Community objectives. The Commission 
further states that the development of the so-called "future industries", 
and of small and medium-sized enterprises as well as the promotion of 
such activities as research and development, protection of the 
environment, and energy saving and substitution may qualify as being in 
the common interest and compatible with the common market. The criteria 
for selecting such areas, however, are far from clear and there is 
considerable need for research and conceptual classification. In doing 
-. 33 - PE 80.041 /f'i n. 
so the Commission should take a broad view of the Community interest 
bearing in mind that convergence of national economies is a key 
Community objective so that national aid schemes applying to the less 
developed areas of the Community and aiming at escalating their 
development should be eligible for exemption, and, further, that 
"future" or "growth" industries are not a uniform set with universal 
validity throughout the Community, but depend on the stage of 
development of particular Community areas and countries : industries 
with limited or no future in developed areas may have considerable 
future in less developed areas while it may take a very long time for 
the latter areas to gain access to the industries that presently are at 
the frontier of technical knowledge. 
54. In the field of regional aids the central problem is to achieve better 
integration with the Community's overall regional policy. In assessing 
progress in this direction it would help if the Commission provides 
more precise information in its next Annual Repor-t on what it calls 
"other criteria based on the European context" for sctutinjzing 
national aid schemes. 
55. As regards sectoral aids, the main developments are the issuing of a 
new code of aids in the steel industry (Decision 2320/81/ECSC>, 
. Council agreement on the Fifth Directive on aids to shipbuilding and the 
tightening of the system of aid control in the textile industry. 
There is clearly a need for assisting crisis sectors, but great restraint 
must be exercised in order to avoid committinglarge amounts of resources 
to industries with limited growth potential in the Community as 
a whole. Some of the pojnts included in the Decision on steel, namely 
the establishment of a timetable for the progressive phasing out of aid, 
the stress on capacity reduction and greater transparency, are to be 
welcomed in this regard. Concern should be expressed, however, about 
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the continuing application of the quota system in the steel industry 
in view of the fact that it tends to punish the efficient producers and 
may not lead to competitive production patterns from a Community point 
of view. T'he need for better integrati·on with the Community's overall 
industrial policy is evident in this field as well. Furthermore, 
the Commission should provide more information on the methods 
employed for, and the results obtained from, the !_Q2!!!!i2ri 
monitoring of sectoral policies and aids. 
56. The Commission's statement that decisive progress has been registered in 
the process of eliminating the discriminatory aspects of the French and 
Italian manufactured tdbaccomonopolies is to be strongly welcomed. 
In response to reasoned op1n1ons served to them by the Commission, the 
French authorities finally complied with all the requests of the 
Commission while the Italian authorities <which had also to deal with 
certain aspects of the match monopoly) settled all the points raised 
except the question of compulsory fixed retail margins which has 
now been brought before the European Court of Justice. 
Irsn~esr~n£~_Qf_finsn£is!_r~!s!i2D~-2~!~!~D-M!m~r_§!s!~~-sn9 
fyQli£_~n9~r!s!iD9§ 
57. Parliament has strongly welcomed the adoption by the Commission of its 
Directive 80/723 on the transparency of financial relations between 
Member States and public undertakings, and regretted the subsequent action 
of three member States, Italy, France and the United Kingdom in seeking 
to have the Directive annulled by the Court of Justice. 
It is to be noted with satisfaction, therefore, that the European Court of 
Justice has recently taken a decision reaffirming the validity of the 
Directive, and rejecting the various arguments put forward by the three 
member States. The Court asserted that the Commission did indeed have 
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58. 
the powers to adopt such a directive, that a directive was necessary since 
the complex financial relations involved were hard to examine in its 
absence, t~at. it created no discrimination between public and private 
enterprises, and that the Commission had generally not exceeded its 
role. 
The Commission does not respond to Parliament's request for a study of 
the implications of Spanish and Portuguese entry into the Community 
for competition policy. The request is renewed as considerable 
problems of adjustment are likely to be encountered. 
59. With regard to the international action of the Community on competition 
matters the guiding principle should be, as pointed out in Parliament's 
resolution on enterprises and governments in international economic 
activity, the estab~ishment of appropriate checks and balances at 
international level thro~gh legislation, guidelines, codes, multilateral 
agreements, and through greater cooperation and exchange of information 
between States. 
60. Guidelines in the field of competition policy, and restrictive business 
practices should form an important element in the proposed United 
Nations code of conduct on multinational enterprises. It is also to be 
hoped that the deadlock in negotiations for a proposed United Nations 
code of conduct on the tr.ansfer of technology, can be broken as soon 
as possible; problems in this area seem to lie primarily in 
differing concepts of what constitute restrictive business practices. 
61. The apparent absence of any Commission initiative in the fields of 
tax avoidance <of which the problem of transfer pricing, mentioned above, 
forms a part), tax havens and flags of convenience is very regrettabLe 
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irrespective of whether it is due tQ a failure to ai)preciate the .impo·rtance 
of these issues or to the fragmentation of the Commission's relevant 
responsibilities. The existence of grossly unfai~·fiscal regimes and 
practices outside the COIIIIftunity poses a serious threat to ,,. 
1 
competition within the Comllltlnity a·s they 'confer undue advantages 
to the persons or companies who are able ·to' make use of them. It is, 
therefore, import•nt that·the Commission reverses its' passive attitude 
and initiates a.vigerous international campaign in all appropriate fora 
in order to abolish such regimes and practices • 
. . 
62. A related issue concerns the establishment of a set of i nte rnat·i on a l 
ground rules in the ar.ea of foreign investunt and governing investment 
incentives and disincentives as called fol" tn ·Parliam·ent 's resolution 
mentioned.above. Such ground rules could help to achieve in this sphere 
what the GATT does, une.venly but stH l ~'latively su~t·essfully in the 
field of international. trade. The tommhsion ri·ghtly place-s a major 
emphasfs.on rectuc.int distortions of competition within ttle 
Community through a .s-trict control of ·State aids. ··A greater grip now 
needs to be ta~en of this problem· at ·international lev~l to prevent 
world-~ide distortions of cQ~Rpetition in what are often world-wide markets. 
The issue of tax havens, referred .to on ·-several occasfons in Parlianu.mt•s 
past resolutions on coMpetition policy, represent just one aspect of 
this probla. · ·· 
63. One final point to nphasize in that context is' that the Community should 
be able to participate fully in its own f'ight· in all international fora 
in the field of ca.petition policy where the Community has a direct role. 
The 11th Report note-s Cin paint 16'1> that· ·the: Community's present status 
in th' operation of the Inter.gove-rnntenta-L Group of. ex·perts on Restrictive 
Business practices· .Cwhich was. set up in. 1981 ahd i's to meet annually> 
"does not yet .allow it:.tQ participate fully; and so. 'it cannot play the 
impo;tant role· whic'h- .should· fall .to it, in a· body ·that seeks to deal 
effectively ~ith the control of restrictive business practices at a world 
level." This situation should be redressed. 
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64. Parliament has a long-standing interest in the Commission's procedures in 
enforcing Community competition policy and in ways'· in which they can be 
imp~oved through achieving the right balance.batween ensuring fairness, speed 
and legal certainty. This concern has been· reflected in Parliament's recent 
resolutions on competition policy, as well as in·numerous written questions 
from individual members of Parliament. In particular, Parliament's resolution 
. . 
on the 10th Annual Report placed a considerable emphasis on procedural 
issues <in paragraphs 40 -:45> and .pointed out that :the Commi.ssion had failed· 
to provide satisfactory answers to the criticisms of its procedures. 
65. The 11th Report represents a-. welconte change in ·th-i.s reSi)ect':, ·;til that :the 
Co•iss_ion has r.-sponded to parliaMent's cri·ticisms in a· far fuller· way than 
~. ' . - . . -~ 
ever before, and has put forward a nUMber of sugg•stions for i~prov1ng 1ts 
own procedures. While some of these suggestions ·seem ten·tat'hl~, and 
need considerable further clarification, and while the ·tommission'has responded 
negatively on certain.other points,· the C.OMiss't.on's··respbnse does permit a more 
. . 
constructive dialogue than in .the past.· 
66. In evaluating the co-.ission's procedures your rapporteur has also been able 
to study the recent report on competition practice prepared by the 
Select Committee.of the House of Lords of the·United Kingdom.· Many of the 
recommendations of this report are of wide validity.·· ' . 
67. In paragraph 41 of its resolution on the 10th Report Pa'rliamet\t requested the 
Commission to report back to Par li uent within· the·· next year with proper. 
appraisal of the advantages and disadvanta-ges of .three 'POSsibl-e 'methods of 
improving its procedures, creation of an intermectia·te trlbunal· below the 
Court of Justice•to deal with competition cases, appointment of an "independent 
person" or persons, .and finally ways of expediting . procedures for granting 
exemptions. · · 
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68. In the 11th Report the Commission has come down firmly in favour of a two-tier 
system of judicial review, a court of first instance dealing with questions 
both of fact and of Law, and a court of second instance merely re-examining 
questions of Law. The Commission does not spell out, however, any details as to 
how this might work, how such a competition court might be constituted and 
the exact range of its functions. There seems to be fairly general agreement 
that a reform of this kind could well be hig~ly desirable, but also concern 
that a number of procedural obstacles would first have to be overcome and that 
this might only constitute a solution in the longer term. In the view of your 
rapporteur a dialogue must now be initiated between the Parliament and the Court 
and Commission to examine the practicalities of such a proposal and to ensure 
that decisions on what the Commission itself describes as "the most appropriate 
way of improving all administrative and Legal procedures relating to competition 
cases" are not indefinitely postponed. 
69. Parliament's second suggestion, for the possible appointment of an independent 
person or persons from within the Commission but independent of OG IV, or else 
appointed by the Court, is, on the other hand regarded unfavourably by the 
Commission in its comments on the idea in the 11th Report. The Commission 
claims that this would raise, although to a lesser degree, many of the 
problems which would be implicit in the appointment of autonomous administrative 
Law judges, a further suggestion which the Commission dislikes, in that it 
feels that these would not be compatible with the institutional scheme of the 
Treaty, and could well make competition procedures in individual cases even more 
complicated and prolonged. 
70. The Commission does, however, state that it is envisaging the appointment of 
hearings officers, "duly authorized to chair hearings, vested with genuine 
autonomy and the right of direct access to the responsible members of the 
Commission". 
71. The idea of. an independent person has been put forward by numerous organisations 
including UNICE, and constituted a considerable part of the discussion at 
the hearings held by the Select Committee on the European Communities of the 
House of Lords. Several of the witnesses argued strongly the case for such 
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an independent person and suggested some of the functions that he might carry 
out, such as giving his prior authorization for "dawn raids" on firms' 
premises, examining matters of legal privilege, chairing hearings and generally 
examining the fairness of Commission procedures. There was a general feeling 
that no new institution should be created, but that such an independent 
person, if cr~ated, should come within the Commission, and perhaps even from 
within DG IV, but clearly distinct from its existing functional directorates. 
There were also a few adverse comments about the idea and particularly that 
it might lead to a new tier of bureaucracy. 
72. Particularly useful evidence came in a written submission from the 
consultative committee of the Bars and Law Societies of the European 
Community in which was stated that perhaps the·central problem at present 
is "that there is no clear division in the structure of the Commission 
bet~een the functions of: 
'-
preliminary investigation 
objective assessment of the facts disclosed by that investigation 
formulation of the charges (objections> against the defendant undertakings 
objective assessment of the case as it finally stands in the light of 
the undertaking's defence; and 
decision, including the !;iecision to impose fines." 
73. The submission went on to state that "so far as the CCBE has been able to 
discover there is no Member State in which all those functions are performed by 
a single authority. It may be suggested that there is a de facto separation 
of these functions within the Commission that. h opeo to doubt but, in any 
event, the functions are not seen to be separated and there is no guarantee 
that they are in fact separated." The CCBE's conclusions were that "the key 
to the problem ••• is to ensure a formal separation (or at least a complete 
and overt de facto separation> of the functions enumerated ••• above and/or 
to introduce an objective guarantee of fairness through the appointment of an 
entirely independent person or tribunal to whom an immediate right of recourse 
is possible, with an unlimited supervisory role in matters of detail." 
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The House of Lords Committee itself recommends the creation of an additional 
post of Director in DG IV, who would preside over hearings, and be "responsible 
for the subsequent conduct of the ~ase, for example advising the Directorate-
General what recommendation to make t-o the Commission and drafting the 
decision." 
74. Such a suggestion could be implemented more quickly and with less procedural 
difficulties than the estabtishment of an independent Competition Court. 
lhe two are of course not incompatible and it may well be desirable to 
concentrate first on a separation of roles within DG IV itself, which 
coutd be complemented later by the Commission's proposal for a two tier 
system of judicial review. Whether the Commission's proposal for hearing 
officers goes far enough to meet the former need is open to question, since 
the scope of such hearing officers responsibilities is not discussed in any 
detail by the Commission. Your rapporteur requests the Commission, therefore, 
to clarify its proposals in this regard. 
75. The third major demand of Parliament was for the Commission to look into possible 
ways of expediting procedures·for granting exemptions. this has become an 
increasingly major problem. As the Commission points out in the 11th Report, 
the number of pending cases has risen to 4,365 of which 3,882 were applications 
or notifications <no less than 185 made in 1981), 250 were complaints from 
firms and 233 were proceedings on the Commission's own initiative. In contrast 
the Commission took 11 formal decisions applying Articles 65 and 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty and 11 applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty. 121 cases 
were settled without the need for a formal decision but, nevertheless, the 
huge backlog is evident. 
76. As the House of Lords' report points out "samples taken of these cases have 
reve'aled the shortest time for an exemption to be 18 months and the longest 
15 years" and the shortest time for a negative clearance 19 months and the 
longest 18 years. The Commission is the first to admit that this poses great 
practical problems for firms, especially in such cases as cooperation agreements 
involving substantial investments. 
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77. The Commission makes two suggestions to alleviate this problem in the 11th 
Report. The first is to strengthen the legal value of the so-called "comfort 
letters'' by ensuring prior publication of a Notice in the Official Journal , 
to give interested third parties the opportunity to submit comments. This 
could certainly help to undercut some of the criticism that has been aimed 
at comfort letters and, while these may not be as satisfactory as more 
formal procedur~s, they may well'be necessary in the interests of speed. 
78. The Commission also proposes to take simplified exemption decisions to solve 
the problem of the numerous cases having common features. Unfortunately 
the Commission does not spell out at all what it has in mind in this regard. 
79. In the long run the granting of well-though out block exemptions will be of far 
greater value. Nevertheless, the Commission will also have to consi'der other 
possible measures. 
80. The House of Lords' report offers two possible s~s of me~sures. The first woulc 
involve the amendment of Regulation No. 17 so as to confer automatic exemption 
on· an agreement after the lapse of a specific period. The second would 
provide that after the summary of an agreement has· been published, and a period 
of 90 days has elapsed without notification of dissent from the Commission, 
the agreement would be provisionally exempt until a final decision by the 
Commission. The provisional protection thus granted would then not be affected 
in the event of a final adverse decision, except in the case of fraud or 
deceit. The Commission should report back to the Parliament on the practicality 
of these two suggestions. 
81. Besides these points the Commission has already indicated that it is 
envisaging a number of other changes to its rules of procedure to respond 
to various other criticisms that have been made. 
82. Perhaps the most important of these concerns access to the Commission's 
files where the Commission states that, subject to factors of confidentiality, 
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it is considering going beyond the requirements laid down by the Court and 
allowing, in principle, firms involved in a procedure to have access to the 
file on the particular case. Such a reform would go a long way towards 
incre~sing confidence in the Commission's procedures, although problems 
could indeed be raised in cases, for instance, where a very large number of 
parties are involved. The Commission must now indicate how it intends to 
proceed on this matter, and clarify how much access it i.nte.nds to give and when. 
83. A particular problem is raised by the issue of "legal professional privilege" 
where the Commission says that it does recognize this principle but is 
awaiting the decision of the Court of Justice in the AM and S case. This 
decision has now appeared and has unfortunately left a number of matters 
still unclear and in particular the status of communications with in-house 
lawyers, in countries where many of them are subject to the same professional 
disciplines as independent lawyers. 
VIII COMMISSION'S ECONOMIC RESEARCH ON COMPETITION POLICY MATTERS 
------------------------------------------------------------------
84. The economic research carried out by the Commission and outlined in the final 
chapter of the 11th Report, while offering interesting insights into existing 
trends in market and price structures, suffers from two weaknesses. First, 
there is insufficient information or discussion with respect to the indicators 
and criteria used for defining certain key concepts such as industrial 
concentration and the relevant market. Second, there is a lack of 
qualitative analysis, in partiuclar as regards the international aspects of 
competition and the advantages and disadvantages of industrial concentration. 
Furthermore, there is no indication as to whether any use is made of the 
results· of this research in the Commissi'on's work in the competition field and 
the same holds for the research conducted by outside consultants and 
organisations on behalf of the Commission. 
85. Your rapporteur's concern about the unsatisfactory state of economic research 
on Community competition policy is not "academic", but springs from the 
belief that more and better research is necessary for improving the 
effectiveness of Commission's action in the competition field. This belief 
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is reinforced by the fact that considerable criticism has often been 
expressed of the Commission's economic judgements in specific cases, 
in particular as regards the definition of the relevant market <1>, 
as well as by the conceptual weakness of its approach to the problems 
posed by the various forms of government assistance and intervention. 
86. A number of practical requests follow from the above analysis. There is, 
first, a clear need for an increase in the economic research staff of 
DG IV and for better integration of research with the rest of OG IV's 
activities. Research should also be extended so as to cover the state of 
competition and efficiency in individual sectors, especially in a world 
context, more general competition policy problems common to a number of 
sectors, and the problems associated with government assistance to, and 
intervention in industry. Finally, there is a need for more 
information on the part of the Commission about the criteria used for 
selecting subjects to be studied by outside experts, and the practical 
use subsequently made of the results of this research. In this regard, 
it should be stressed again that the Commission must follow up its enquiries 
on price structures with practical measures designed to eliminate unacceptable 
price disparities. 
87. The inclusion in the 11th Report of a separate chapter on competition 
policy and the role of socio-economic and political interest groups as 
well as the Commisston•s decision to consult the Economic and Social 
Committee on competition policy issues of general Community interest covered 
in the Annual Report is a welcome response to Parliament's repeated calls for 
closer involvement of interested organisations in the conduct of Community 
competition policy. However, the effective cooperation and support of 
industry associatiQns, trade unions and consumer groups with regard to 
the objectives of this policy requires more direct contacts and the creation 
------------(1) As, for instance, in the Continental Can case and the Hugin case, 
see "Reports of Cases before the Court", Luxembourg 1979. 
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of better channels of information and communication. 
88. Your rapporteur fully acknowledges that in a number of ways the Commission's 
11th Report on competition policy is much more responsive to Parliament's 
comments in its resolutions on competition policy than any of its 
predecessors. New sections, and chapters have been introduced to cover 
themes on which action has been called for by the Parliament, in particular 
as regards the question of procedures and the involvement of socio-economic 
and political interest groups. Nevertheless on a number of issues, such 
as transfer pricing and the international action of the Commission in the 
competition field, gaps still remain while, in a more general way, progress is 
not evident in the direction of Parliament's earlier call for strengthened 
economic research and better integration of competition policy objectives 
with the objectives of other Community policies. However, the Eleventh 
Report could mark the beginntng of better cooperation between Parliament 
and Commission in 'the competition field based on the understanding that 
in each subsequent report subjects previously raised by the Parliament 
receive an effective response from the Commission • 
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0 P I N I 0 N 
of the 
Legal Affairs Committee 
Mr D'ANGELOSANTE was appointed draftsman on 30 April 1982. 
At its meetings of 19/20 October and 2 November 1982, the Legal Affairs 
Committee considered the Eleventh Report on Competition Policy (Doc. 1-86/82> 
on the basis of a draft opinion prepared by its draftsman and the amendments 
tabled thereto <PE 80.659, PE 80.659/Am. 1-5 and PE 80.659/Am. 6). 
At the meeting of 2 November 1982, the committee adopted the text 
reproduced on the following pages by 13 votes to 3. Consequent upon this 
decision, Mr D'Angelosante resigned as draftsman. 
The following took part in the vote: Mrs Veil, chairman; Mr Chambeiron, 
vice-chairman; Mr Berkhouwer <deputizing for Mr Geurtsen>, Mrs Cinciari 
Rodano, Mr Cottrell <deputizing for Mr Turner), Mr D'Angelosante, Mr oalzfel, 
Mr Del Duca <deputizing for Mr Ercini>, Mrs van den Heuvel <deputizing for 
Mr Ferri>, Mr Irmer (deputizing for Mr Visentini>, Mr Janssen van Raay, 
Mr Prout, Mr Sieglerschmidt, Mr Tyrrell, Mrs Vayssade and Mr Vie. 
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The Legal Affairs Committee urges the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
to take account of the following points in its report: 
<a> the importance of Commission control over undertakings; this control 
should ret.ain 'its administrative nature and aim at maximum effectiveness; 
Cb> in view of the need for a regulation governing mergers and .in the 
light of t~e changes which have taken place in the economy, the CQIIIIIIission 
should also be instructed to give closer consideration to the'application 
of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty in such a way that it stimulates economic 
activity rather than complicating or restraining it; 
Cc> ~~e need for a favourable assessment of a number of measures exempting 
small and medium-sized undertakings fr.om the prohibition on restrictive 
~ ' ' . 
practices; 
. . 
<d> ·the need for a neutral attitude by the Community to the nationalization 
of undertakings in the Member States; 
<e> the beneficial progress made by the CoMission in its proc~du.r~s .f.or 
investigation and adjudication in the field of competition policy in 
accordance with the recommendations of the European Parliament in its 
report on the.Tenth Competition Policy Report (Doc. 1-689/81>; 
(f) the procedures of the Commission in the exercise of its jurisdiction in 
the field of competition policy should ensure maximum effectiveness 
together with fairness and transparency for the undertakings under 
investigation. The following procedural matters are relevant: 
i. the Commission should ensure that, pursuant to its assurance·in 
paragraph 17 of the Eleventh Competition Policy Report, the subjects 
of investigation under Article 14 of Regulation 17/1962 are fully 
and precisely specified in order that undertakings are aware of 
their nature and extent. 
ii. the Commission should supply the undertaking which is the subject 
of an investigation with a copy of the investigators' report or 
at least a summary of its conclusions. 
iii. the Commission should specify the procedures it intends to adopt 
in order to implement the principles established by the European 
Court of Justice in its decision in A.M. & s. <Europe> Ltd v. 
Commission <case 155/79) concerning legal professional privilege. 
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iv. the Commissi~n•s statements concerning access to the file and the 
development'of non-confidentjal summari~s of its .contents are to 
be welcomed. The Commission should nevertheless review th~ working 
- . 
of these matters in practice, to ensure a consistent and fair approach. 
further, the Commission should, while respecting confidentiality, 
disclose the substance of complaints against the undertaking. 
v •. the Legal Affairs Committee recalls to the Commission the resolution 
of the European Parliament calling upon it to publish its internal 
Rules of Procedure in the investigation and adjudication of suspect~d 
infringements and the Commission's assurance to the Legal Affairs 
Committee that it intended to do so; 
Cg> .the positive attit.ude of the Commission to a two-tier system of judicial 
review (paragraph 16). Such a system, favoured by both the Commission 
and the European Court of Justice, would obviate much of the current 
procedural difficulties and criticisms. 
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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
C 0 R R I G E N D U M 
to the report by Mr PAPANTONIOU on the Eleventh Report 
of the Commission on competition policy (Doc. 1-845/82) 
Motion for a resolution 
Paragraph 56 
Subparagraph (iii) to read as follows 
(iii) Research in the area of government assistance to, 
and intervention in, industry, such as the long-term 
impact of aids on industrial structures and efficiency 
and the effectiveness of crisis cartels~· 
PE 80.041/corr. 

